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COMMENT
IN CASE TERROR STRIKES
AMERICA AGAIN:
CONSIDERING A PERMANENT FUND FOR
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
ROBYN K. BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
Eleven years ago, two crashing towers shattered the American illusion
of security. What began as a normal day at work ended in smoke, rubble,
and thousands of families changed forever. The entire nation, once confi-
dent in its indestructibility, suddenly recognized the extent of its vulnerabil-
ity. No longer did terrorism occur “over there,” but right at home.
Over time, the American people would learn that 2,977 victims lost
their lives due to the September 11, 2001, attacks (“9/11”),1 and thousands
more were injured.2 But these numbers represent only a fraction of those
who were affected. Children were orphaned, spouses were widowed, and
shock and grief reverberated throughout society. In the face of such a
profound national tragedy, the American public expressed unprecedented
sympathy for the victims and their families by showing solidarity through
numerous prayer vigils, memorial altars, ribbons of remembrance, financial
donations, and the ubiquitous display of the American flag. Yet, the Ameri-
can people also expected leadership from their government in discerning
how to respond and move forward.
The government replied, and swiftly. One aspect of its multifaceted
response was the creation of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund
* Robyn Brown is a 2012 graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law. She
thanks her tremendously supportive family, friends, and professors (especially Hank Shea) for
their consistent encouragement and guidance. She notes with appreciation the hardworking Law
Journal staff, whose editorial suggestions enhanced this Comment.
1. NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FOUND., FAQ
about 9/11, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/node/780891 (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
2. Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Ad-
ministrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 180–81 (2005) [here-
inafter Ackerman, Effective Response].
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(“Fund”).3  Among the multiple purposes of the Fund were protecting the
airline industry from collapse, providing financial assistance to victims and
their families, and building public trust in the government. The Fund was
widely hailed as a compassionate response, although it took some criti-
cism.4 The nation stands eleven years later, seemingly stronger—but also
aware of its fragility. Terrorist attacks continue throughout the world, and
the September 11, 2012, attack on the Benghazi consulate5 was a stark re-
minder of the United States’ continued vulnerability. In light of this reality
and lessons learned from the administration of the Fund,6 the federal gov-
ernment should create a permanent fund for victims of terror that will stand
ready to expeditiously address victim needs in the event of a future attack.
This Comment will explore the historical development, administration,
and rationales underlying the Fund. Next, it will examine what can be
learned from other compensation programs. It will then set forth some con-
siderations for policymakers and suggest features of a future permanent
American fund for victims of terror. Part I will describe the federal govern-
ment’s compensation for victims of terrorist acts prior to 9/11. Part II will
walk through the creation of the Fund, examine its administration, assess its
effectiveness, and describe updates to the Fund since its creation. Part III
will give an overview of other (non-9/11) compensation programs, includ-
ing federal and state funds in America, international compensation pro-
grams established by the United Nations, and Israel’s permanent fund for
victims of hostile acts. Part IV will examine several justifications for com-
pensating victims, and Part V will suggest practical considerations for
policymakers. Finally, Part VI will make specific recommendations regard-
ing the creation and administration of a permanent fund.
3. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, as part of Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42 §§ 401–09, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (2001).
4. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 157–61; accord Betsy J. Grey,
Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a Permanent Compensation System for
Domestic Terrorist Attacks, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 673 n.50 (2006).
5. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three American personnel were killed in an attack on the
U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Statements on the Deaths of American
Personnel in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 13, 2012), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2012/09/197820.htm. The attack was later deemed a terrorist attack. Helene Cooper, Libya
Envoy’s Killing was a Terrorist Attack, the White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/middleeast/assault-on-consulate-in-libya-a-terrorist-attack-
white-house-says.html.
6. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004) at 78–84, available at http://www.
justice.gov/final_report.pdf [hereinafter FEINBERG ET AL.]; see also KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT
IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005)
(speaking on his personal experience as Special Master).
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I. PRE-9/11 RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Prior to 9/11, the federal government had some experience compensat-
ing victims of hostile acts. After the War of 1812, Congress passed a statute
providing relief to victims who had property lost, taken, or destroyed due to
the war.7 A single commissioner was appointed to establish rules and
processes for distributing the funds, though the statute did not provide for
any judicial review of his broad discretion.8 The public was upset by the
commissioner’s “excessive generosity,” and in response, Congress amended
the statute to add bureaucratic oversight.9 As a result of this change, many
victims received either disproportionate awards or no awards.10
In more recent years, the World Trade Center attack in 199311 and
Oklahoma City bombing in 199512 led to enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.13 This law amended the Victims
of Crime Act14 by adding 42 U.S.C. § 19693(b), giving the Office for Vic-
tims of Crime (OVC)15 access to the emergency reserve fund in domestic
and international terrorist incidents by authorizing the OVC director to sup-
plement state crime victim compensation programs.16 Since then, OVC has
provided supplemental grants to assist victims of the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 (1988), the Oklahoma City bombing, the Khobar Towers mili-
tary barracks bombing (1996), the bombing of the American embassies in
7. Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, 3 Stat. 261 (1816).
8. Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the Le-
gitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16–17
(2006).
9. Id. at 17–18.
10. Id. at 18.
11. See generally U.S. FIRE ADMIN., THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING: REPORT AND
ANALYSIS 1, 20, USFA-TR-076 (Feb. 1993), available at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/
pdf/publications/tr-076.pdf (explaining a bomb composed of nitrourea—a white, crystalline,
highly explosive powder—and hydrogen was detonated in the parking garage of the North Tower,
killing six people and injuring 1,042).
12. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO TERRORISM VICTIMS: OKLAHOMA
CITY AND BEYOND, NCJ 183949, 1 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/pdftxt/
NCJ183949.pdf (explaining the Oklahoma City bombing was an attack on the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building that killed 167 people and injured hundreds more) [hereinafter “DOJ”].
13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
14. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (“VOCA”), 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, About OVC, http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/ovc/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (“Established in 1988 through an
amendment to the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) of 1984, the OVC is charged by Congress with
administering the Crime Victims Fund (the Fund). Through OVC, the Fund supports a broad array
of programs and services that focus on helping victims in the immediate aftermath of crime and
continuing to support them as they rebuild their lives.”).
16. DOJ, supra note 12, at 23; Grey, supra note 4, at 666 n.11 (2006); see U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITERRORISM EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/ovc/pdftxt/AEAP_Brochure.pdf.
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Kenya and Tanzania (1998), and the Columbine High School massacre
(1999).17
After these incidents, in 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a
publication entitled Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and
Beyond, exploring lessons learned and offering recommendations for future
victim services in the case of future acts of terrorism or mass violence.18 No
one, however, could have predicted the enormity of 9/11, or how it would
set in motion an unprecedented generous approach to victim compensation.
II. THE 9/11 FUND
The magnitude of 9/11, and what seemed to be a forthcoming disas-
trous collapse of the airline industry, propelled Congress to act quickly. The
airlines’ liability insurance would not be able to handle the onslaught of
expected litigation,19 so Congress stepped in to pass emergency legislation.
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA)20
was signed into law with minimal congressional debate, on September 22,
2001, just eleven days after it was introduced in the House of
Representatives.21
The ATSSSA gave the airline industry federal loan guarantees of up to
ten billion dollars, compensation of up to five million dollars for direct
losses incurred due to a federal ground stop order, compensation for “incre-
mental losses,” reimbursements for increased insurance costs, and deferral
of depositing excise taxes.22 Further, in response to calls from the airlines
and the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) for a compensation
program that would shield airlines from liability, Congress created an alter-
native compensation program for victims.23 Title IV of the ATSSSA insti-
tuted the Fund,24 which was added to the bill in just one day as a
“congressional afterthought.”25 The ATSSSA also discouraged lawsuits by
giving the federal court in the Southern District of New York exclusive
17. DOJ, supra note 12, at 23, 27–28.
18. See DOJ, supra note 12, at ch. VIII.
19. See Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 24–25 (explaining the airlines had approximately six
billion dollars of insurance coverage, but the financial damage from 9/11 was estimated to be at
least $35 billion).
20. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (2001) [hereinafter ATSSSA].
21. Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 146; accord FEINBERG, supra note 6, at
XV; accord Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 5.
22. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 5.
23. Grey, supra note 4, at 671–73; see Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the
Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1867 (2002).
24. Julia Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV.
167, 197 (2004).
25. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 16.
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jurisdiction over claims arising out of 9/11, and by capping airline liability
at the maximum of its liability insurance.26
A. Administration of the Fund
Title IV of the ATSSSA provided for a Special Master to be appointed
by the Attorney General to administer the Fund.27 The term “special
master” came from common law, referring to someone who assists the court
in a specific way.28 However, in the case of the Fund, the position was not a
judicial officer or agency administrator, but rather an unprecedented posi-
tion not subject to judicial review.29 Attorney General John Ashcroft ap-
pointed Kenneth Feinberg to the position.30
Feinberg had an extensive legal background that uniquely prepared
him for the position, including serving as a special master to mediate a
settlement in Agent Orange litigation and as a mediator and settlement ad-
ministrator for Fortune 500 companies.31 He wanted to become Special
Master of the Fund so he could use his broad experience in dispute resolu-
tion skills to serve the 9/11 victims and their families.32 He offered to do all
of his work for the Fund pro bono.33
The job requirements were daunting. Title IV gave the Special Master
broad discretion over administering the new Fund but failed to provide any
judicial oversight or much guidance.34 Looking back on his time as Special
Master, Feinberg remarked that determining awards from the Fund “called
for the wisdom of Solomon, the technical skill of H&R Block, and the in-
sight of a mystic with a crystal ball.”35 He described serving as the only
rule-maker, judge, and jury for the Fund: “Thus began the most harrowing
experience of my professional life. In the end, it was also the most
rewarding.”36
Though Feinberg was the ultimate administrator of the Fund, he hired
a large legal and accounting staff to help with verifying eligibility of claim-
ants, answering questions, and making initial award calculations for re-
26. Id. at 18–19; see Rabin, supra note 23, at 1841,1853–58.
27. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42 §§ 404, 407, 115 Stat. 230, 237–40 (2006).
28. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 10.
29. See George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 528, 531 (2003); see also Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 9.
30. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at XV–XVI, 27.
31. Id. at 2–14.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 148; see generally FEINBERG, supra note
6, at 25–26 (explaining his decision to offer services pro bono was partially because it seemed
inappropriate to seek compensation during such a far-reaching disaster, and partially because he
wanted to avoid criticism from the public for being paid).
34. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 9.
35. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 87.
36. Id. at XVI.
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view.37 The overwhelming amount of paperwork kept Feinberg and the
staff working many long hours.38
The first important task involved establishing regulations for adminis-
tering the Fund. First, potential claimants needed to know if they were eligi-
ble for an award. Section 405 of the ATSSSA defined “claimant” as:
(A) an individual who—(i) was present at the World Trade
Center, (New York, New York), the Pentagon (Arlington, Vir-
ginia), or the site of the aircraft crash at Shanksville, Penn-
sylvania at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001; and (ii)
suffered physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash;
(B) an individual who was a member of the flight crew or a pas-
senger on American Airlines flight 11 or 77 or United Airlines
flight 93 or 175 [with exclusions for those deemed to be partici-
pants in the attacks]; or (C) in the case of a decedent who is an
individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the personal rep-
resentative of the decedent who files a claim on behalf of the
decedent.39
However, these vague provisions left many unanswered questions for
the Special Master. While victims of terrorist attacks prior to 9/11 were
clearly not covered,40 the statute did not specify what “the immediate after-
math” of the 9/11 incidents entailed, nor did it specify how wide of an area
could be included at each site. Feinberg thus determined the “ambit of risk”
by talking with police and firefighters.41
He also narrowed the class of eligible claimants to those who sought
medical treatment within seventy-two hours.42 The Fund would not grant
awards for latent injuries caused by exposure to toxins in the aftermath of
the attacks,43 though this was later changed.44 Property loss and psychologi-
cal harm would also not be compensated due to the statute’s limitation of
awards for “physical harm or death.”45 The interim regulations specified
that eligible claimants must have sustained “physical injury inflicted by the
terrorists in the immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center or Pentagon
and subsequent contemporary medical treatment.”46
Feinberg faced other difficult decisions concerning the class of eligible
claimants. He determined that foreign applicants, including undocumented
37. Id. at 31–34 (PricewaterhouseCoopers won a bid to administer the Fund).
38. Id. at 38–39.
39. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 405, 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2006).
40. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 21, 67.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 42; see Rabin, supra note 23, at 1843–44.
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 405, 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2006); see Rabin, supra note 23,
at 1840–42.
46. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 43.
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immigrants in America, were eligible for awards.47 Moreover, he guaran-
teed claimants the information on their applications would not be shared
with other government agencies for immigration enforcement purposes.48
For questions about who had priority in a claim and the eligibility of fi-
ance´es, same-sex domestic partners, and estranged parents, the statute pro-
vided no guidance.49 Religious books and clergy could not offer Feinberg
clear direction on these questions.50 He thus looked primarily to the state or
foreign laws of the decedent’s domicile and worked to mediate between
potential claimants when necessary.51
The Special Master also exercised discretion in determining the mone-
tary amount of awards. The skeletal provisions of Title IV provided a three-
part formula for these calculations: (1) economic loss (the financial circum-
stances of each victim), (2) noneconomic loss (pain and suffering), and (3)
offsetting the awards by funds recoverable from collateral sources such as
life insurance and death benefits.52 Feinberg was also guided by three pub-
lic policy considerations: (1) consistency for victims of similar career posi-
tions, (2) transparency through public outreach and accessible information,
and (3) narrowing the gap between high and low awards.53
The ATSSSA did not specify a maximum award claimants could re-
ceive, so regardless of how much Feinberg awarded one person, it would
not diminish another person’s award.54 However, he charged himself with
the responsibility of “social engineering” to ensure the disparity between
economic loss awards was not too great.55 For noneconomic loss, Feinberg
found that he was unable to quantify and compare the pain and suffering of
each claimant or deceased victim, so he awarded each the same amount.
Feinberg looked to the death benefits given to public safety officers killed
in the line of duty as a starting point56 and determined an award of
$250,000 for the noneconomic loss of each deceased 9/11 victim.57 Despite
many compelling stories of victims’ heroism, he decided the award would
not change; rather, “[h]eroism by all was presumed.”58 On the issue of col-
47. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 29–30.
48. Id.
49. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at XI, 68–69.
50. Id. at XVI–XVII, 90–91.
51. Id. at 39–40 (state laws); id. at 69–70 (foreign laws); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Disas-
ters, Families, and the Law, 28 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., Winter 2007, at 35, 41 (noting that
Feinberg’s efforts to resolve conflicts were not always successful).
52. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 34–36; ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42 §§ 402, 405(b), 115
Stat. 230, 237–38 (2006).
53. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 46–47.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Id. at 156.
56. See generally Public Safety Officers Death Benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2006).
57. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 39, 76; see also Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2,
at 154 (discussing that presumed non-economic losses for those killed in the attacks of 9/11 would
be in the amount of $250,000).
58. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 125.
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lateral sources, Feinberg decided not to deduct charitable awards the claim-
ants received in order to encourage the public to continue contributing.59
Not only did eligibility criteria and the amount of awards have to be
determined, but also an application and award process needed to be put in
place. What was intended to be a simple process ended up including an
application containing thirty-one pages.60 Claimants were given an option
between two different tracks. Track A would give the claimant an award
determination within forty-five days of the application’s submission, then
the claimant could accept the award or request an individualized hearing.
Claimants choosing Track B would proceed directly to a hearing after their
eligibility was established.61
The opportunities for claimants to be heard were part of Feinberg’s
design for due process.62 He oversaw 931 of the hearings.63 At the hearings,
claimants could be represented by counsel, submit evidence, and call wit-
nesses. There were no written records of the hearings, but the Fund was
required to notify the claimant of the award in writing within 120 days.64
ATLA offered free legal assistance.65 Claimants were given until December
22, 2003, to file their claims.66
For quick turnaround of claims, Feinberg developed a streamlined pro-
cedure using a presumptive award formula based on key variables of annual
salary, the age of the victim, and number of the victim’s dependents.67 The
charts helped families communicate with the Fund and decide whether to
apply. Feinberg also gave family members the opportunity to meet with him
before filing an award to get a “guesstimate” range if they were uncertain
about applying.68 This guesstimate was important because claimants were
required to waive their right to sue once they filed applications with the
Fund.69 The process was designed to give claimants more certainty about
their awards and eliminate the uncertainty and lengthy tort litigation pro-
cess.70 In addition, claimants could request emergency funds for an advance
on benefits that would later be deducted from their awards.71
59. See id. at 71.
60. Id. at 44–45 (explaining this was necessary to collect information needed for accurate
awards and to minimize fraud).
61. Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 155–56.
62. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 44.
63. Id. at 98.
64. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 155–56.
65. Id. at 156. ATLA established a non-profit organization called Trial Lawyers Care to
provide legal assistance to victims of 9/11.
66. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 21.
67. See id. at 45–46; see also FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
68. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 78–79.
69. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
70. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 198.
71. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 45 (only 236 claimants took advantage of the emergency
award option).
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Once the interim final rules were proposed on December 21, 2001, the
public was given an opportunity to comment on them.72 Feinberg lived out
of a suitcase for a year, conducting over one hundred town hall meetings
regarding the interim regulations and draft application.73 During the com-
ment period, 2,687 comments were received.74 Several groups—including
personal injury lawyers, victims’ groups, organized representatives of res-
cue workers, and politicians—voiced concerns over aspects of the Fund.75
One common concern was that the presumptive award tables stopped at an
income level of $231,000, but many of the victims had higher salaries.76
Other criticisms included the failure to articulate a coherent theory of jus-
tice,77 failure to understand victims’ real needs,78 and the failure to provide
a review mechanism to the Special Master’s discretion.79 Some found the
cap on airline liability for tort suits to be arbitrary or irrational.80 In addi-
tion, many found the Fund too narrow because it only awarded victims of
the 9/11 attacks rather than victims of all terrorist incidents or other crimes
or accidents.81
B. Assessment of the Fund
The public had high expectations for the Fund. While it was not ex-
pected to replace lost lives, it was expected to recognize the loss and the
income the deceased and injured would have otherwise provided to their
dependents.82 Yet, Feinberg faced a difficult struggle in helping families
understand he was not placing a price tag on the moral worth of those who
perished or were injured as a result of the attacks.83
Indeed, some claimants criticized the Fund for treating people as statis-
tics rather than humans, and some saw the formulas as unfairly valuing one
life more than another, when all had suffered a common disaster.84 Some
wanted a simpler award of the same amount for each victim, and many
lamented the complex application process. Moreover, the Fund could not
72. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 148–49; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note
6, at 5.
73. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 49–50.
74. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
75. Rabin, supra note 23, at 1868.
76. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 152. Feinberg’s reasoning for this
decision was that 98% of earners in America earned less than that amount, and income above that
mark tended to be highly variable each year. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 73.
77. See Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 174; see also Ackerman, Effective Response, supra
note 2, at 138–39.
78. See Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 174.
79. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 138–39.
80. See Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 34.
81. See Grey, supra note 4, at 679.
82. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 224–27.
83. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 154.
84. See Grey, supra note 4, at 678–81.
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provide the kind of healing many victims and families sought, and the claim
process even exacerbated some family conflicts.85
Despite these shortcomings, the Fund was hailed as a success in the
end. It met its goal of preventing airlines from collapsing under litigation,
as 97% of claimants filed with the Fund and waived their right to sue.86 The
administrative costs were very low considering the number of employees
involved in administering the Fund.87 Perhaps most importantly, it provided
victims and their families with a tangible sense of closure and the ability to
begin moving on with their lives.88 Pointing to these successes, Feinberg
claimed, “I believe [the Fund] can fairly be considered the valedictorian of
all compensation programs, public or private.”89
There are several reasons for this success. In his book, Feinberg points
to the extraordinary efforts enabling this success: giving families detailed
information about their likely recoveries, taking proactive steps to ensure
claimants would receive their maximum award, giving each claimant the
opportunity for a hearing, and providing claimants with a way to avoid the
uncertainties of litigation.90 The generous pro bono efforts of many attor-
neys who assisted claimants also contributed extensively.91 Feinberg also
acknowledged the full support of Attorney General Ashcroft, along with
pressure he placed on himself, as influential factors.92 Finally, the unprece-
dented generosity of the American people in granting “over $7 billion in
tax-free compensation” to claimants was vital.93
While even some critics acknowledge the success of the Fund,94 this
type of generosity is not a sustainable precedent for the future.95 Moreover,
it is difficult to determine which type of attacks or disasters should receive
85. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 141–43.
86. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 180–88; FEINBERG, supra note 6, at
164.
87. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 164–65 (noting that despite hiring approximately 450 employ-
ees, administrative costs were only 1.2% of the total awards disbursed).
88. See Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 227–28; FEINBERG, supra note 6, at
175.
89. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 164.
90. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 165–67.
91. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 71.
92. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 169.
93. Id. Recipients were not required to pay taxes on the awards. Victims of Terrorism Tax
Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002).
94. See Editorial, 9/11 Fund Closes Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, http://www.ny-
times.com/2004/06/18/opinion/9-11-fund-closes-its-doors.html (asserting the Fund met its dual
purposes of protecting the airlines and providing a compassionate response to the attacks); see
Grey, supra note 4, at 680–81 (discussing criticisms but acknowledging the Fund “successfully
fulfilled its purpose”); see Ackerman, Effective Response, supra note 2, at 227 (calling the Fund
“[f]or the most part . . . a success”). See also FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 163 (highlighting the
supportive response from the American public and the media).
95. Even Feinberg himself stated, “I would not use the fund as a model in the event of future
attacks.” FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 178.
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compensation and which should not.96 Feinberg noted that the massive im-
pact on the airline industry was an exceptional situation that required a cre-
ative and bold response, but the civil justice system has adequate
alternatives that promote responsibility and safety in many other
situations.97
C. Expansion of the Fund
Legislation enacted since the creation of the Fund has expanded its
benefits. The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 provided tax
benefits to victims of 9/11.98 And Congress passed the James Zadroga 9/11
Health and Compensation Act of 2010 (“Zadroga Act”) to expand eligibil-
ity to persons harmed by exposure to toxins in the aftermath of 9/11.
Though these victims were excluded under the original rules if they did not
discover their injuries or receive treatment by the filing deadline, the
Zadroga Act opened the Fund to them.99 The final rule was issued August
31, 2011, amending and reactivating the Fund to include those who were
injured or killed as a result of “the debris removal efforts that took place in
the immediate aftermath of [9/11] crashes.”100 The final rule further ex-
panded the geographic zone recognized as the “9/11 crash site”101 and ad-
ded other acceptable forms of proof for establishing eligibility.102
III. OTHER COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
While the scope and process of the ad hoc Fund were unique in Ameri-
can history, the nation has enacted several other compensation programs in
the past to shield industries from liability. Additionally, individual states
have established and continue to administer workers’ compensation pro-
grams and crime victim compensation programs.  Beyond the United States,
other nations and the broader international community have created and im-
plemented compensation programs for victims of crime. These programs
96. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 79–80.
97. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 178–80.
98. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427
(2002). It also provided these tax benefits to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing and the
anthrax incidents following 9/11. Id.
99. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, Title II
(2011) [hereinafter “Zadroga Act”].
100. Final Rule, James Zadroga, 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg.
54112, 54119 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104)  [hereinafter “Final Rule,
Zadroga Act”].
101. Title II of the Zadroga Act expands the “9/11 crash site” to include the crash sites, routes
of debris removal, and contiguous areas where the Special Master determines there was risk of
harm. Final Rule, Zadroga Act, 76 Fed. Reg., supra note 100, at 54113–14; Raymond Hernandez,
Zone for 9/11 Compensation in Lower Manhattan Is Expanded, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/nyregion/zone-for-911-compensation-fund-is-expanded-in-man-
hattan.html.
102. Final Rule, Zadroga Act, 76 Fed. Reg., supra note 100, at 54112.
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are worth examining because they offer valuable insight into the purpose,
rationale, and administration of compensation funds. If America establishes
a permanent fund for victims of terrorism, it need not start from scratch. It
can examine best practices from the Fund and other programs, then con-
sider them in the unique context of terrorist threats to America.
A. American Federal Compensation Programs
Besides the Fund, prior federal compensation legislation includes the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, the National Swine Flu Act of 1976, and the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Each of these programs
were enacted to limit the liability of certain private industries in which the
government had an interest, to provide a more certain outcome, and to dis-
tribute compensation quickly to claimants. These programs are worth not-
ing because a permanent fund for victims of terrorism would have similar
goals.
The Price-Anderson Act was enacted to ease the entry of private indus-
tries into the nuclear energy field by guaranteeing federal compensation in
the event of a nuclear accident.103 In exchange for purchasing private liabil-
ity insurance and donating $10 million per year to the compensation fund,
the Act imposed a cap on nuclear power industry liability and established
exclusive federal jurisdiction so the industry would not be subject to state
tort claims.104 Though the compensation program was rarely used, it en-
couraged growth of nuclear power plants. However, it was criticized by
some for promoting “unbalanced and uncontrolled growth of the nuclear
power industry, allowing the industry to deteriorate.”105
Two decades later, the National Swine Flu Act established a compen-
sation program for victims who died or were injured from government-
mandated swine flu vaccines.106 The federal government took on vicarious
liability for all participating manufacturers, shielding the manufacturers
from liability.107 In another effort to limit the liability of vaccine makers,
ensure enough vaccines, and stabilize vaccine costs, the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act was enacted to compensate the pain and suffering of a
child’s injury or death from a required vaccine.108 This act created the Vac-
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1957) (amended multiple times 1958–2005); Berkowitz, supra note 8,
at 32.
104. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 32. The compensation program was challenged in court be-
cause it retroactively revoked litigation rights from claimants, but the Supreme Court affirmed its
constitutionality because it offered a “reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort
law it replace[d].” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt’l. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).
105. Grey, supra note 4, at 697.
106. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 31.
107. Id.
108. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, 3758 (1986); Grey, supra note 4, at 699. See also
Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 30 (explaining the purpose and operation of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act).
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cine Injury Compensation Fund from a tax on certain vaccine sales, and it is
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services.109 Claim-
ants can accept the Special Master’s decision and waive their right to sue,
or they can reject and file suit.110 The Special Master’s decisions are subject
to judicial review by the Court of Claims and, if needed, the Federal
Circuit.111
B. State Compensation Programs
Besides these specialized federal compensation programs, states estab-
lished workers’ compensation programs in the early twentieth century.112
While the programs vary from state to state, they generally are the only
remedy for injured workers, they exclude damages for pain and suffering,
and they preclude tort claims.113 Some claimants criticize these programs,
saying the awards are insufficient to cover their needs.114 Fraudulent claims
and complicated interactions with other federal laws also plague these
programs.115
In the mid-1960s, states also began to develop compensation programs
to provide short-term emergency help to victims of violent crimes.116 To-
day, all fifty states have crime victim compensation programs.117 Each state
has different rules, but most programs are primarily funded by fines and
fees collected from convicted criminals.118 By instituting the use of these
fines instead of public funds, states were able to avoid clarifying the justifi-
cation for the programs.119 These programs are important to consider be-
cause they cumulatively present a picture of the rationale, structure, and
range of compensation Americans deem as reasonable for victims of crime.
These compensation programs generally have underlying rationales of de-
terrence and corrective justice (because offenders pay), and distributive jus-
tice (by addressing the relationship between offenders and the
community).120
Observations from the federal and state compensation schemes reveal
common themes including (1) trading individualized corrective justice so
more people receive compensation, (2) limiting judicial review of discretion
in exchange for distributing benefits more quickly, (3) protecting certain
109. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 30.
110. Grey, supra note 4, at 700.
111. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 30.
112. Grey, supra note 4, at 704.
113. Id. at 706–07.
114. Id. at 708.
115. Id.
116. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 182–83.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 172.
119. Id. at 175.
120. Id. at 176, 218–19.
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industries through general tariffs on the industries, and (4) establishing in-
centives for claimants to stay within the system.121
C. International Compensation Programs
The international community has established three compensation funds
for victims of crime and oppressive acts, two of which are administered by
the United Nations (UN). The UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture
distributes funds to non-governmental organizations that provide humanita-
rian aid to victims of torture and their family members.122 The UN Volun-
tary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery extends humanitarian,
legal, and financial assistance through established channels to individuals
who have suffered violations of human rights due to slavery.123
The Rome Statute provided for the creation of the third fund, the Trust
Fund for Victims (TFV), which operates quasi-independently from the In-
ternational Criminal Court.124 The TFV was the first compensation program
in international criminal justice.125 In addition to paving the way for victim
compensation in international criminal justice, the Rome Statute also pro-
vided for the principle of victim participation at every stage where their
interests are implicated.126
According to some scholars, the foundation underlying international
compensation funds is solidarity127 and the idea that “international crime is
a consequence of international coexistence.”128 This reasoning provides jus-
tification for all sectors of society—including governments, NGOs, inter-
governmental organizations, private businesses, and individuals—to
121. Grey, supra note 4, at 709–10.
122. U.N. Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, G.A. Res. 36/151.P 1(a), U.N. DOC. A/
RES/36/151 (Dec. 16, 1981); Frederic Megret, Justifying Compensation by the International
Criminal Court’s Victims Trust Fund: Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 123, 132–33 (2010).
123. G.A. Res. 46/122, U.N. DOC. A/RES/46/122 (Dec. 17, 1991); Megret, supra note 122, at
132–33.
124. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 79, para. 1 opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also Megret, supra note 122, at
125–26 (stating that the TFV operates as a para-judicial administrative agency to the International
Criminal Court but also has autonomy in some aspects due to its voluntary funding source contrib-
uted by governments, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and individuals). See gener-
ally Victims Trust Fund Campaign, Questions and Answers: The Victims Trust Fund of the ICC,
COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-
VTFC-FAQ.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (giving additional information on the Victims Trust
Fund).
125. Megret, supra note 122, at 139.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 124, at art. 68, para. 3. See also Megret, supra note 122, at 139
(noting how the Rome Statute provided for victim participation of this kind for the first time in
history).
127. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 203, 206 (2006).
128. Megret, supra note 122, at 198. Various “causes” of international crime include colonial-
ism, economic disparity, global indifference, and supporting criminal regimes. Id.
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contribute to the funds.129 While such compensation may be criticized as
“governmental paternalism,” victims in the international realm are often
very limited in what individual steps they can take to protect themselves.130
D. Israel’s Permanent Compensation Fund for Victims of Hostile Acts
Because Israel has had a permanent fund for victims of terrorism for
over forty years that has grown and been refined along the way, looking at
its system in-depth provides useful insights for policymakers and advocates
about how the United States should address victims of terrorism. Israel has
had a comprehensive permanent fund for victims of hostile acts since 1970
due to its turbulent history of terrorism and hostile acts.131 After the Six-
Day War in 1967, violent acts against Israelis expanded throughout Israel
and abroad, so the government enacted the Victims of Hostile Action (Pen-
sions) Law (VHAPL).132 The VHAPL expanded the legislative scheme ini-
tially covering those harmed by war to include victims of terrorism, and it
has continued expanding since that time to include more benefits for more
victims.133
Israel takes a broad view of eligibility for the VHAPL. Its definition of
“enemy-inflicted injury” includes attacks with a nationalistic motive,
whether or not the perpetrator was involved with a recognized terrorist
group.134 The VHAPL provides a rebuttable presumption that an injury is
enemy-inflicted if it is “under circumstances affording reasonable grounds
for believing” it is enemy-inflicted.135 The VHAPL covers not only Israelis
in Israel, but Palestinian-Israelis, foreigners injured while legally in Israel,
certain foreign nationals affiliated with Israel, and employees of certain Is-
raeli entities abroad.136 While the law does not cover foreign workers lack-
ing legal status in Israel, a loophole provides them with medical treatment
and humanitarian aid. Recently, the government has given these workers
full financial benefits.137
129. Id.
130. Id. at 199.
131. Israel experienced a war for independence, five wars in forty-four years, and waves of
terrorism, and throughout this time it provided compensation to victims on a case-by-case basis.
Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the
Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2003).
132. Id.; Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730-1970, 24 LSI 131 (1969–70) (Isr.)
(authorized translation of Hebrew into English prepared by Israel’s Ministry of Justice) [hereinaf-
ter VHAPL].
133. Sommer, supra note 131, at 336–37.
134. VHAPL, supra note 132; Grey, supra note 4, at 712–13. Even a single individual acting
against a Jew, if acting with nationalistic motive, can satisfy the “hostile act” requirement. Som-
mer, supra note 131, at 339–42 (discussing V.A. (T.A.) 4076/98, Coca v. Approving Auth.,
32(10) Dinim-Dis. Ct. 485 (Isr.)).
135. Sommer, supra note 131, at 340.
136. Grey, supra note 4, at 713; see also Sommer, supra note 131, at 342–43 (describing the
extension of compensation schemes to foreign nationals).
137. Sommer, supra note 131, at 342 n.38.
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The program compensates eligible victims for medical care, giving liv-
ing stipends for those unable to work for an unlimited amount of time, reha-
bilitation (vocational training, higher education, or funds for starting their
own businesses), and other specialized types of financial compensation.138
For families of deceased victims, the VHAPL provides the benefits to the
victims’ families including monthly benefits for the surviving spouse, be-
reaved children, and bereaved parents.139 The compensation is based on a
percentage of the salary of a low-level government employee, plus possible
alimony.140 In addition, the VHAPL will compensate families for burial and
mourning expenses, plus yearly memorial services (including transporta-
tion).141 Families may also be eligible for additional benefits such as tax
breaks, help buying a car, school grants, business loans, health expenses,
and Bar/Bat Mitzvah expenses.142
In addition to the VHAPL, Israel enacted the Property Tax and Com-
pensation Fund Law to compensate victims for personal property damaged
from hostile acts.143 A common goal between the VHAPL and the Property
Tax and Compensation Fund is returning claimants’ lives to normal as soon
as possible after an attack.144 The assurance of compensation provides a
sense of psychological support so victims and families know they are not
suffering alone. Law professor Betsy J. Grey suggests that as a result, Israe-
lis tend to respond to terrorism by resuming their normal lives.145
The rationale behind these programs is the idea of spreading loss
among society.146 Essentially, because “every restaurant and bus has be-
come a potential frontline in terror’s war,” Israel has adopted a risk-sharing
policy that ensures the entire society bears the cost rather than individuals
or families.147 This policy is consistent with its extensive social welfare
policy for other segments of the population.148
The National Insurance Institute (NII)—the equivalent of the Social
Security Administration in the United States—administers the VHAPL.149
The Medical Committee of NII makes initial award decisions,150 which are
138. Id. at 343–47.
139. Id. at 348–51.
140. Id. at 348–49.
141. Id. at 349–50.
142. Id. at 350–51.
143. See generally Sommer, supra note 131, at 335–36, 355–57 (summarizing provisions of
the Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law and how it differs from the VHAPL).
144. Id. at 356.
145. Grey, supra note 4, at 725.
146. Id. at 712; see also Sommer, supra note 131, at 338 (noting Israeli Finance Committee
Chairperson, M.K. David Pinkas, and British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, as advocating
that these costs should not be borne only by those attacked but by all of society).
147. Sommer, supra note 131, at 339.
148. Id. at 359–60.
149. Id. at 343.
150. Grey, supra note 4, at 714.
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appealable to NII and may be appealed further to the Labor Tribunal.151
Notably divergent from the 9/11 Fund, the Israeli system does not require
claimants to choose between filing with the State or pursuing a lawsuit.
Claimants may only recover once, but they may pursue both a suit for dam-
ages and a compensation claim.152 The victim can then choose to revoke the
lesser of the two remedies.153
Features of Israel’s program bring up several important aspects of es-
tablishing a program that the United States should carefully consider: how
broad eligibility should be, whether property loss should be covered,
whether grants for education and job training should be provided to victims
who are recovering, the size of the financial award to the victim or his
family, which federal department should administer the program, and
whether claimants should have the option of pursuing litigation.
IV. POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR A PERMANENT FUND
While the United States has not endured another terrorist attack even
close to the massive scale of 9/11, smaller attempts since 9/11 and the vola-
tile global political situation remind Americans that the threat must always
be taken seriously. Feinberg predicts there will be calls for a new compen-
sation program if there is another attack.154 But is it the federal govern-
ment’s responsibility to ensure compensation to victims? And if so, should
it create an ad hoc fund to address one specific incident or a permanent fund
designed to address multiple situations? These questions have prompted
scholarly discussion and speculation, but a decade after 9/11, Congress has,
de facto, chosen to compensate victims of future terrorist attacks through
the ad hoc route.
This portion of the Comment will explore possible justifications for
creating a permanent fund and compare those rationales with American val-
ues155 to find points of convergence that could meet American needs and
expectations. The main justice theories generally implicated when discuss-
ing compensation are corrective justice, distributive justice, and deter-
rence.156 Within these broader categories are social contract theory, shared
risk rationale, social welfare theory, protection of certain industries from
litigation costs, providing an alternative to an inadequate tort system, com-
passionate generosity, efficiency of handling claims, and the combination of
political motivations and public expectations.
151. Id.
152. Sommer, supra note 131, at 351–52; see also Grey, supra note 4, at 713–14 (describing
how remedies under the VHAPL are not exclusive and claimants may also pursue a lawsuit).
153. Sommer, supra note 131, at 351–52.
154. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 177.
155. The author concedes not all Americans share these values, but they are widely perceived
as common values of the nation as a whole.
156. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 176.
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Social contract theory is a rights-based reasoning that looks to the
State as the guarantor of preventing harm, and seeks to hold the State re-
sponsible when it fails.157 Under this theory, citizens pay taxes for the ful-
fillment of this contract.158 However, American courts have rejected this
notion as a response to terrorist attacks.159 The government responded to
the American public’s demand for answers by launching the 9/11 Commis-
sion160 to investigate the attacks.161 The United States has not admitted its
liability.162 The state did not “cause” the attack by failing to prevent it.163
Therefore, the choice to compensate victims was political, not a legal obli-
gation.164 Furthermore, when examining social obligations from a criminal
justice perspective, “[t]here is nothing in the logic of criminal justice—in its
simplest expression, that the guilty should answer for their crimes—that
suggests a larger societal responsibility to victims.”165
Another possible justification for compensation, shared risk rationale,
is a mix of corrective and distributive justice theory that seeks to spread the
loss among society. The idea is that “[c]rime is . . . a cruel sort of lottery
that is particularly bereft of any moral meaning, except that by not seeking
to correct it the state, in a sense, ratifies the injustice.”166 This theory looks
to all to “share the risk engendered by society’s ineptitude.”167 The shared
risk rationale also aligns with John Rawls’ theory of behavior behind a “veil
of ignorance”—that is, if we each did not know what social circumstances
we would be situated in or what would happen to us in the future, we would
all want to live in a society that had a compensation fund.168 Such a com-
pensation fund would advance corrective justice if the State could collect
payments from perpetrators. It would also advance distributive justice by
addressing the relationship between the offenders, victims, and the commu-
157. Grey, supra note 4, at 683–92; Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Un-
fair Treatment? Aid to Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83, 88 (2001).
158. Megret, supra note 122, at 178.
159. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 213–14.
160. The 9/11 Commission was established on November 27, 2002, as “an independent, bipar-
tisan commission created . . . to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances sur-
rounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate
response to the attacks . . . [and] to provide recommendations designed to guard against future
attacks.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/911/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013); see also Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408 (2002).
161. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT (2004), at XV, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.
162. See Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 219 (stating that funding of victim compensation based
on tort damages is “unprecedented” for a government that has not admitted fault).
163. Megret, supra note 122, at 194.
164. Id. at 171.
165. Id. at 151.
166. Id. at 189.
167. Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 51, 67 (1986).
168. Megret, supra note 122, at 189–90.
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nity169 and meeting the communitarian goal of being our brother’s
keeper.170
Another potential foundation for the creation of a permanent fund is
social welfare theory. This theory focuses on meeting immediate needs and
recognizing the social origin of crime, that is, the idea that society as a
whole is responsible for the evil that springs from it.171 The obligation is
social, rather than legal or moral.172 Compensation in this context would
seek to bring rehabilitation, restoration, and equity to victims.173 While so-
cial welfare theory is “‘the most widely advocated basis for victim compen-
sation,’”174 and state crime victim compensation funds have many
similarities with welfare,175 states seem to have rejected this rationale be-
cause they do not use public funds for victim compensation.176 Perhaps by
funding the programs through fines and fees, the states were trying to avoid
common welfare criticisms about “governmental paternalism” or allowing
people to abandon individual responsibility.177 The Fund did not appear to
have social welfare theory as its underlying foundation, as the Special
Master made individualized determinations that diverge from the social
welfare theory of meeting basic needs.178
Protecting certain industries from financial ruin is another possible
motivation for creating a permanent fund for victims of terrorism.179 If, as
in the case of 9/11, victims are unable to recover restitution or punitive
damages because the terrorists are unavailable, they will seek other solu-
tions from the legal system.180 After 9/11, the airlines, airplane manufactur-
ers, airports, persons with property interests in the World Trade Center, and
169. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 218–19.
170. Robert M. Ackerman, ADR in the Aftermath Post-Disaster Strategy: Mitigating Disaster:
A Communitarian Response, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 284, 292 (2007) [hereinafter
“Ackerman, ADR”].
171. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 214–15; see also Megret, supra note 122, at 192–94 (stat-
ing that “crime is not only meted against society but that it is in a sense also produced by social
life itself”).
172. “[T]hese responsibilities and duties derive from the conditions of modern society and the
grace of the state, not from a legally recognized liability in the relationship between the state and
its citizenry.” Burt Galaway & Leonard Rutman, Victim Compensation: An Analysis of Substan-
tive Issues, 48 SOC. SERV. REV. 60, 63 (1974); Megret, supra note 122, at 192–93.
173. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 1854–56 (criticizing the individualized justice model as
“inconsistent with the premises of compensating the victims of September 11”).
174. Megret, supra note 122, at 192–93 (quoting ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM:
CRIME VICTIMS AND COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25 (1983)).
175. State crime victim compensation programs often include assistance such as rehabilitation
or training, take into account current and future needs, are offset by collateral sources, and are
administered bureaucratically in a consistent way. Megret, supra note 122, at 195–97.
176. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 215–16.
177. See Megret, supra note 122, at 199 (stating that it is unlikely that individuals would
subject themselves to international crime in order to collect victim welfare funds).
178. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 199.
179. See id. at 195–96 (reporting that 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund set up in part to protect
airline industry from major financial losses).
180. Megret, supra note 122, at 149–52.
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even the City of New York may have been potential defendants in law-
suits.181 Congress quickly determined that keeping the airline industry oper-
ational was in the nation’s interest, and this became the primary purpose for
enacting the ATSSSA.182
Practical reasons may provide additional justification for a permanent
fund.183 Part of the intention of the Fund was the creation of an alternative
to an inadequate tort system.184 The traditional theory of the tort system,
corrective justice,185 was viewed as insufficient not only because the ter-
rorists were unavailable for prosecution, but because the lengthy litigation
would have caused even greater stress to the victims already facing huge
burdens.186 Moreover, other parties that were available to be sued simply
did not have the resources and insurance to compensate such a large class of
victims and their families.187
While the other rationales look at a broader societal picture, another
underlying principle, “compassionate generosity,” encompasses a more vic-
tim-centric view.188 While the Fund was primarily designed as part of the
government’s plan to keep airlines in business, it also was partially moti-
vated by the desire of Congress to extend sympathy and help to victims and
families who were suffering.189 Indeed, this response was seen in the Amer-
ican public as a whole as they rushed to donate blood and inundated chari-
ties with over one billion dollars in donations.190 This impulse to respond
charitably is based on generosity as an act of virtue.191 Feinberg specifically
mentioned this aspect of the Fund in the introductory statement of the In-
terim Final Rule when he called it “an unprecedented expression of com-
passion . . . designed to bring some measure of financial relief . . . to those
most in need.”192 Whether or not such a humanitarian response is a “moral
obligation”193 may be argued, but the undeniable evidence of a nation
moved by compassion is proof that many people search for a way to con-
nect when they see suffering.
181. See Sommer, supra note 131, at 351 n.102.
182. The Act’s purpose was “to preserve the continued viability of the United States air trans-
portation system.” ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
183. Megret, supra note 122, at 163.
184. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 220–21.
185. Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 289.
186. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 220–21.
187. For example, the airlines’ insurance coverage was insufficient to cover anticipated dam-
ages. See supra text accompanying note 19.
188. See Megret, supra note 122, at 183.
189. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 403, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
190. Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard: Thoughts about Schedules, Caps, and Collat-
eral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
393, 393 (2003).
191. Megret, supra note 122, at 184.
192. Landsman, supra note 190, at 399; September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
66 Fed. Reg. 66274, 66274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
193. Megret, supra note 122, at 183–87.
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The potential for efficient processing of claims is another important
reason for creating a permanent fund.194 The Fund allowed victims and
families to receive their awards very quickly in comparison to the long and
uncertain litigation route.195 While the Special Master was appointed
quickly and regulations for the ad hoc Fund were promulgated within ninety
days of the signing of the ATSSSA,196 having a permanent fund and admin-
istrative body in place would allow for even quicker processing and distri-
bution of claims in the event of a future attack. This would also relieve
Congress of the difficult task of creating reactive legislation and would en-
able victims and their families to address financial burdens and move on
with their lives more quickly.
The intersection of political motivations and public expectations is an
additional reason for creating a permanent fund.197 When society is rocked
by an event so tragic and far-reaching as 9/11, it will look to the govern-
ment for a response.198 For the sake of social stability and maintaining
power, the government has an interest in placating public opinion and re-
sponding to its citizens’ expectations. By promoting a perception of stabil-
ity, sustaining certain industries, and appearing victim-sensitive, it can
restore public trust that has been shaken by disasters like 9/11.199
In light of these sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting
rationales, it is important to consider the specific American context that
differs from an individual state, a foreign country, or the broader interna-
tional community. Common American values of individualism, indepen-
dence, and pride in a strong work ethic should be considered.200 Due to
their pick-yourself-up-by-your-own-bootstraps mentality and the concept of
limited government, Americans generally do not expect the government to
reimburse them for all unfortunate events that may befall them.201 How-
ever, this American self-reliance has still allowed for compassionate re-
sponses to extraordinary disasters, as the country’s reaction to 9/11
demonstrates.
194. Id. at 163–64.
195. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 21.
196. Landsman, supra note 190, at 399–400.
197. See Megret, supra note 122, at 153–55 (“Victim compensation schemes serve definite
political agendas of governments who are intent on portraying themselves as ‘victim-sensitive.’”).
198. Id. at 154.
199. Id. at 153–54.
200. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 178–79.
201. See Grey, supra note 4, at 729 (“Government does not act as an insurer of last resort to
compensate those who die as a result of their own choices or life’s misfortunes.”); see also FEIN-
BERG, supra note 6, at 181–82 (explaining that the resolve shown by victims of the Oklahoma City
bombing characterize this ideal of independence).
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V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
To provide for a sustainable compassionate response that fits its
unique needs and values, the United States must explore many aspects of
creating and implementing a new permanent fund for victims of terrorism.
It must first discern whether victims of terrorism should be treated differ-
ently than victims of other crimes.202 While “[v]ictims of acts of terrorism
are not ontologically more deserving of compensation than victims of other
crimes in proportion to the harm suffered,”203 a different response to vic-
tims of terrorism is justified when taking into consideration the unique char-
acteristics and intentional nature of the attacks.204 Terrorists have specific
goals such as destabilizing the nation, so responding through a permanent
fund may be one strategic way to prevent terrorists from accomplishing
their goals.205 Moreover, the practical need to provide a rapid, effective
response to a potentially large number of victims also provides justification
for a differentiated approach.206
But should a permanent fund be established, or should the federal gov-
ernment create ad hoc funds as needed? For this analysis, we must compare
the advantages and disadvantages of a permanent compensation fund.
A. Advantages of a Permanent Compensation Fund
The advantages of a permanent fund are many. Because America is not
currently reeling from the immediate shock of a terrorist attack, it can de-
velop a long-lasting program through a slower, more deliberate and detailed
legislative process than what occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. The process
of conversation, hearings, and debate would allow the American public to
have a voice in value judgments rather than tasking one person with that
role.207 If a fund were put in place through such a process, the public would
adjust its expectations accordingly in the event of another attack.208
Developing a permanent fund would provide a chance to clarify the
criteria for when the federal government should intervene and compensate
victims.209 A permanent fund would also result in a more equitable and
202. See Grey, supra note 4, at 729; FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 178–79.
203. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Criminal Justice Response to Support
Victims of Acts of Terrorism 71 (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/
terrorism/Victims_Rights_E-Book_EN.pdf [hereinafter “UNODC”].
204. See Megret, supra note 122, at 132–33 (advocating for victim compensation schemes for
victims of violent intentional crimes within a nation’s borders).
205. See UNODC, supra note 203, at 3.
206. See id. at 3, 70–74, 93–94.
207. Sommer, supra note 131, at 362.
208. Grey, supra note 4, at 729.
209. Law professor Robert Ackerman suggests that policymakers determine these criteria by
looking at the inherent nature of the disaster, asking how state, local, and private sources will
interact with federal relief and whether political will exists to provide compensation without “a
perceived crisis du jour.” Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 294–95.
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efficient system of distribution for similarly situated victims, as a structured
process and trained personnel would already be in place before an attack
occurred.210 In addition to these administrative benefits, a permanent fund
would provide a psychological “safety net” for the public—the assurance
that the government has a proactive response ready in the event terrorists
again succeed in targeting the nation.211 Providing a place for victims to
turn, social support, material resources, and a sense of psychological clo-
sure would also help society return to the status quo more quickly.212 All of
these advantages would enable the nation to better manage the long-term
effects of terrorism.213 Moreover, careful establishment of a permanent
fund would avoid potential constitutional challenges that could plague ad
hoc compensation programs.214
B. Disadvantages of a Permanent Compensation Fund
These positive aspects must be considered alongside the disadvantages
of a permanent fund. Economic implications must be analyzed. Along with
the cost of bureaucracy in setting up and administering a permanent fund,
there could be demands from the public to increase awards, as gradually
happened with Israel’s permanent fund.215 However, these economic factors
are difficult to accurately predict because amount and extent of loss from
terrorist attacks can vary widely.216 Without being able to predict the future,
it is unlikely society can accurately assess whether a permanent fund will be
fiscally advantageous compared to an ad hoc fund.217 However, this uncer-
tainty should not excuse policymakers from putting forth their best efforts
to design a permanent fund that is realistic in the extent it can compensate
victims. A permanent fund can be adjusted later if future events show weak-
nesses in its structure or administration.
Another potential advantage of an ad hoc fund over a permanent fund
is that a retrospective ad hoc fund can assess priorities and respond to the
unique situation of each event more flexibly.218 However, a permanent fund
210. See Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 295–96 (arguing that a victim compensation
system similar to single payer health insurance can alleviate the “problem of unequal treatment.”).
211. Id. at 294–95.
212. Grey, supra note 4, at 721, 724–26; see also Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 292–93
(“[T]he goal of a system financed primarily by taxpayers should be to give victims of disaster . . .
the wherewithal to get on with their lives. . . . Sustenance that allows . . . families to get past the
immediate crisis can provide for a more stable future [and] allow these families to become produc-
tive once again . . . .”).
213. Grey, supra note 4, at 750.
214. A permanent fund would be more likely to survive constitutional attack if it is considered
a reasonable substitution for tort action and addresses future claims, rather than responding retro-
actively. Id. at 730–36.
215. Sommer, supra note 131, at 364.
216. Grey, supra note 4, at 723.
217. Sommer, supra note 131, at 364.
218. Grey, supra note 4, at 723.
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provides more long-term stability, as the legislative process will involve
more time for detailed study, economic projections, and informed debate
about what the nation can afford to consistently sustain in the event of mul-
tiple terrorist attacks.219 Moreover, a permanent fund could intentionally be
built with a basic structure that provides room for flexibility in the event of
small- or large-scale attacks.
Another potential disadvantage of a permanent fund is that Americans
may end up institutionalizing a two-tiered system that compensates victims
of terrorism more than victims of other crimes.220 This already happened
when the nation decided to offer compensation for victims of 9/11 through
the ad hoc Fund, using broader criteria for eligibility and offering more
generous compensation than the state victim compensation programs.221
Because crime victim compensation programs vary from state to state, it
will be impossible for a permanent fund to match the eligibility criteria,
benefits, or administrative process of any state exactly. However, an ad hoc
fund would face this same disadvantage, and the process of creating a per-
manent fund would provide a greater opportunity for close consideration of
this very issue. Open and thorough discussions with the public are the best
way to acknowledge and strategically confront this perceived unfairness,
rather than trying to hide it by designing a one-time solution that further
ignores the dissonance.
C. Implementation Considerations for a Permanent Fund
If a permanent fund is selected, America will need to determine the
foundation and goals that will underlie its establishment. It must also make
many decisions about the eligibility, benefits, and administration.222
1. Eligibility Criteria: Who Will Qualify as a Claimant?
In terms of pragmatics, policymakers must first determine eligibility
for the program. They must decide what type of attacks will be covered, and
this task will likely involve creating a definition of “terrorism.” Establishing
a definition of terrorism has been an elusive endeavor, but the common
thread for events considered terrorist acts against the United States seem to
include the following characteristics: risks beyond those normally assumed
in society, the result of an ideological campaign to instill fear and violence,
219. Id. at 736.
220. See Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 225 (noting that the generosity shown to victims of 9/
11, when compared to that shown to victims of domestic and sexual abuse, may be indicative of
the differential attitude developed toward victims of domestic and sexual abuse).
221. See id. at 224–25 (“[T]he 9/11 Fund illuminates the frequently unmet financial and prac-
tical needs victims of violence constantly face.”).
222. See generally Edda Kristja´nsdo´ttir, International Mass Claims Processes and the ICC
Trust Fund for Victims, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 167, 179–94 (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the practical chal-
lenges facing mass claims processing).
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and action directed against all Americans.223 These factors differentiate ter-
rorism from other crimes.224 Many legal and scholarly experts use the U.S.
Department of State’s definition: “premeditated, politically motivated vio-
lence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.”225
The new fund will need to specify the scope of acts it will cover—for
example, whether the acts must occur within America, or if attacks abroad
will be covered also. The OVC established the International Terrorism Vic-
tim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) in 2006 to compensate
certain victims of international terrorism abroad for “expenses associated
with that victimization.”226 Policymakers will need to determine if the new
permanent fund will be combined with ITVERP, supersede ITVERP, or act
as a separate compensation program altogether. Currently, ITVERP com-
pensates nationals of the United States or officers or employees of the U.S.
government who are directly injured—either physically or emotionally—in
an act of “international terrorism” as designated by the Attorney General.227
Once the scope of incidents covered is established, policymakers must
determine who will be eligible claimants. The United States will need to
have some frank and politically-charged discussions about domestic part-
nerships, unauthorized immigrants, and priority of relationships before
coming to conclusions about who may receive compensation.
2. Benefits: What Will Claimants Receive?
Another important aspect of the new fund would be determining how
much compensation is appropriate. This depends upon the goals of the
fund—if preventing litigation is a main goal, then compensation must be
substantial enough to give claimants incentive to choose the new fund.228
And while the Fund was sui generis, the American people will still likely
have expectations of generous compensation for a future terrorist attack.229
Feinberg advised that the prior work of the Fund should not be precedential,
because awarding millions to victims and their families is not sound public
policy in the American context of limited government.230 He also advised
against individualized determinations, advocating for standardized awards
223. Goldscheid, supra note 24, at 209.
224. Id.
225. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2006).
226. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 28 C.F.R. § 94.11(a)
(2012) [hereinafter “ITVERP”].
227. Id. at § 94.21; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Who is Eligible?,
INT’L TERRORISM VICTIM EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM, http://www.ovc.gov/intdir/itverp/
eligibility.html (last visited June 17, 2012).
228. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 187.
229. Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 293.
230. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 179.
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in the future.231 Uniform awards for similar injuries would streamline
processing and avoid causing division between victims.232
Funding a permanent compensation scheme must also be addressed.
America must decide how much money such a fund would require and how
to acquire those funds. In the current economy, Americans may not be will-
ing to support another entitlement program, and policymakers may lack the
political will to push any new legislation forward that carries a large price
tag. Another financial aspect that must be considered is whether awards
should be offset by collateral sources. Doing so would lighten the financial
load on the government, but many victims would find it unfair. For exam-
ple, victims could interpret such a rule as penalizing them for planning
ahead and purchasing substantial life insurance policies. Charities would
also find it harder to collect donations if donors perceived their donations
would be “subsidizing” a government program. In the spirit of uniformity,
Feinberg suggests not deducting collateral sources at all.233
3. Administration: Who Will Oversee the Fund?
Beyond eligibility and funding for the new permanent fund for victims
of terrorism, an administrator of the fund must be established. The govern-
ment could appoint a special master again, but the same criticisms and dan-
gers would exist. The Fund’s Special Master was “a rare, and tenuous,
judicial creature,” as he was not appointed by a court as other special mas-
ters are, so his discretion was not answerable to a judge or supervised by the
adversarial process.234 Alternatives that would enhance accountability in-
clude a stronger appointment process, the appointment of several special
masters, or the appointment of federal magistrates or judges instead of a
special master.235 In addition, incorporating the fund’s administrators into
an existing federal agency would provide more structure and oversight.236
Administrative agencies generally hire organizationally independent admin-
istrative law judges to conduct hearings, and their decisions are usually re-
viewable or have sufficient due process safeguards where their decisions are
precluded from review.237
Several departments are potential candidates for the task of housing
the new fund: the Department of Homeland Security,238 the Social Security
231. Id. at 182–83.
232. Id. at 184–85.
233. Id. at 185.
234. Berkowitz, supra note 8, at 20.
235. Id. at 38–40.
236. Id. at 39.
237. Id. at 20–22.
238. See generally History of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/history (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (stating the Department
was created after 9/11 to secure the nation from threats). Its agencies include Transportation Se-
curity Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
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Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of
Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime. Each of these agencies has experi-
ence administering and adjudicating applications for benefits and/or allocat-
ing funding for benefits.
D. Non-Monetary Compensation Considerations
Other considerations beyond financial compensation require the atten-
tion of policymakers. Non-monetary and symbolic forms of compensation
should not be neglected.239 Victims and their families have intangible needs
for healing and restoration—to what extent should a new fund address these
needs? And from a broader perspective, how should it provide for society’s
intangible needs?
1. Commemoration of Victims
One important need is commemoration. Passing on “shared context,
shared mourning, and shared memory” through creating a narrative of
events has been important to all societies, religions, and cultures.240 This
narrative may take many forms such as raising awareness, sharing informa-
tion, educating younger generations, erecting statues of heroes, building
museums, naming streets, hosting memorial services, collecting and distrib-
uting scholarship funds, creating works of art, and publishing books.241
Such efforts to remember victims and their families help them know they
are not alone and reaffirms that the world is a compassionate place.242 In a
survey of surviving families of 9/11 victims, 95% of respondents mentioned
the importance of public and private rituals on anniversaries of the
attacks.243
In 2011, the National September 11 Memorial opened in Manhattan,244
providing a public space of remembrance. The Memorial is comprised of
twin reflecting pools with names of victims inscribed on bronze panels
Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret Service, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Id.
239. Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United Nations
Principles and Guidelines, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 19, 39–40 (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009).
240. Yael Danieli, Massive Trauma and the Healing Role of Restorative Justice, in REPARA-
TIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 41, 63 (Carla
Ferstman et al. eds., 2009).
241. Id. at 63–64.
242. See id. at 48, 63–64.
243. Kathleen Nader & Yael Danieli, Cultural Issues in Terrorism and in Response to Terror-
ism, in THE TRAUMA OF TERRORISM 399, 405 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 2005).
244. The Memorial was dedicated on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, on September 11, 2011.
It opened the next day to the public. NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD
TRADE CENTER FOUND., When Did the 9/11 Memorial Open?, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911
memorial.org/node/320816 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
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along the pools.245 In addition, a museum is under construction to “bear
solemn witness” to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 1993 World Trade
Center.246 Its mission is one of remembrance and resilience.247
The Memorial and Museum are funded by public funds totaling over
$330 million and private donations of over $350 million.248 Policymakers
should determine what type of remembrance events, monuments, or muse-
ums would be appropriate for future acts of terrorism, and whether these
should be financed through the new permanent fund, charitable donations,
other public funds, or a combination of these sources.
2. Restoration of Victims, Families, and Society
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has outlined several
other non-monetary forms of justice that may also be appropriate in in-
stances where human rights have been violated.249 Many of these principles
provide relevant guidance in responding to terrorist attacks. Some of these
measures include acts of restoring the victim to his or her original situation
through family reunification, citizenship, employment, and property.250 The
provision of rehabilitative care, including medical, psychological, legal, and
social services are another form of justice.251 Other non-material govern-
ment responses that may be appropriate in response to terrorist acts include
truth-seeking (such as the 9/11 Commission), searching for victims, and
recovering and burying remains.252 In addition, government can strengthen
“guarantees of non-repetition” through institutional reform, emergency re-
245. NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FOUND., About
the Memorial, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/about-memorial (last visited Mar.
17, 2013).
246. NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FOUND., The
Mission, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/mission (last visited Mar. 17, 2013); see
NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FOUND., Frequently
Asked Questions, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/faq/general (last visited Mar. 17,
2013).
247. “Demonstrating the consequences of terrorism on individual lives and its impact on com-
munities at the local, national, and international levels, the Museum attests to the triumph of
human dignity over human depravity and affirms an unwavering commitment to the fundamental
value of human life.” NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
FOUND., The Mission, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/mission (last visited Mar.
17, 2013).
248. NAT’L SEPTEMBER 11 MEM’L & MUSEUM AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER FOUND., Pub-
lic-Private Partnership, 9/11 MEMORIAL, http://www.911memorial.org/public-private-partnership
(last visited Mar. 17, 2013). Public funding includes the Lower Manhattan Development Corpora-
tion, the State of New York, and the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey. Id.
249. Van Boven, supra note 239, at 38–39; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶¶ 15–23, U.N. DOC. A/
RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter “Basic Principles”].
250. Basic Principles, supra note 249, at 7.
251. Id. at 8.
252. Id.
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sponse training, law enforcement, media coverage, and industrial
safeguards.253
3. Participation of Victims and Families in the Award Process
Allowing victims to participate in the compensation process is another
important component of healing that the Fund sought to implement. Victims
and families were given an opportunity to have individual hearings, where
many shared memories and emotions.254 Feinberg witnessed that memory
seems to hold value as a “pain reliever.”255 Though allowing for individual
hearings took considerable time and resources, many victims found it to be
an important part of finding closure and moving on.256
4. The Roles of Communities and Faith in Healing
While the federal government can choose to implement many or all of
these steps toward holistic restoration, Professor Robert Ackerman of
Wayne State University Law School, and former director of the Center for
Dispute Resolution at Pennsylvania State University’s Dickenson School of
Law, points out that government is not enough for complete healing.257 He
stressed that law is not the sole answer, but time, patience, and community
are also important.258 While acknowledging the importance of a large-scale
government response for some tragedies, he also advocates for a strong web
of local support systems in civil society, starting with small units that are
closest to the problems.259 Ackerman attributes the tendency of society to
respond to the Jewish concept of holistic restoration: “[W]hen disaster
strikes . . . we have a natural human inclination to reach out and to engage
in Tikkun Olam (healing the world).”260
Many victims, families, and members of society have also drawn upon
their own beliefs to find meaning, healing, and hope. Through his interac-
tions with many families and survivors, Feinberg noted they expressed a
wide variety of reactions to God, including newfound faith, renewed faith,
and lost faith.261 Spiritual and religious beliefs and practices are often used
as coping strategies and to help victims “reconstruct a meaningful narrative
following traumatic experiences.”262 Moreover, local support systems al-
ready know the communities they are serving, what resources are available,
and have experience strategizing about how to effectively serve specific
253. Id. at 8–9.
254. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 114.
255. Id. at 149.
256. Id. at 113.
257. Ackerman, ADR, supra note 170, at 285.
258. Id. at 299–300.
259. Id. at 284–85, 289.
260. Id. at 284 (emphasis removed).
261. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 131.
262. Nader & Danieli, supra note 243, at 404.
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groups. Thus, rather than trying to provide for every need, a new permanent
fund should leave space for—and encourage—the participation of faith and
community organizations in the healing and rebuilding process.
VI. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING A PERMANENT FUND
Taking all of this into consideration, policymakers should design a per-
manent fund that best suits the nation. The fund should acknowledge the
unique harms of terrorism, the needs of victims, the government’s financial
limitations, and the role of non-governmental actors in restoration and
recovery.
A. Recommendations for the Rationale Underlying the Permanent Fund
The government’s experience with 9/11 and the Fund should inform its
future policies. While the government has legitimate interests in keeping
certain industries afloat, it should not allow the fear of their collapse to
motivate awarding millions of dollars to each victim of terrorism. It is not
realistic to establish a program that the American people cannot afford. A
smaller, standardized award for each claimant, combined with some forms
of non-monetary compensation, would still be a meaningful gesture to show
solidarity and help meet victim needs.
While consideration of each theory described in Part IV will probably
help shape the future policy in some way, a blend of shared risk rationale,
social welfare theory, and efficiency of processing claims hold the most
promise for becoming the foundation of a coherent and sustainable federal
program. Such a blended foundation would recognize that each of us could
one day be the victim in need of restoration. It would emphasize the role of
community while viewing our fellow man with active compassion. Such
underlying motivation would seek to treat victims equally—not with unsus-
tainable awards of millions of dollars, but with enough to meet basic needs.
It would also recognize the limitations of government while seeking to
maximize resources to distribute funds quickly to those in need. This
blended justification would require some sacrifice from the public in order
to provide compensation for those most affected by terrorism, but it would
also leave space for communities to respond with compassionate
generosity.
B. Recommendations for Award Eligibility
Victims should be defined broadly to prevent qualified individuals
from facing administrative difficulties. A broad definition will facilitate the
disbursement of awards quickly to those in need, because the administrator
will not need to waste valuable time determining which individuals and
groups Congress intended to compensate. Unlike the Fund, which was later
expanded by the Zadroga Act to incorporate more qualifying individuals, a
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broadened definition should be a part of the new fund’s regulations from
the outset. The new fund’s compensation plan should include all individuals
injured or killed in the attack, rescue, or recovery within a reasonable pe-
riod following the incident. Additionally, the new fund’s regulations should
have a provision that would allow victims to receive awards if they apply
for funding within a certain time period of discovering their latent injuries.
Eligibility should not be based on U.S. citizenship or permanent resi-
dency, so that the maximum number of victims may be helped. The victims
will have all endured the same tragedy, and their nationality or immigration
status should not prevent a compassionate response. Expanding the defini-
tion of victim to include even unauthorized immigrants would be a reasona-
ble response in light of the reality of the large unauthorized population in
America, the prior awards given to unauthorized immigrants under the
Fund, and the nation’s interest in preserving strong relationships with the
world community. To ensure equal treatment of victims of overseas or do-
mestic terrorist attacks, the new permanent fund should supersede ITVERP.
Americans and those who have an obligation of loyalty to America (refu-
gees, permanent residents, etc.)263 should file claims with the new program
whether the attack occurs in America or abroad, and whether the attack was
specifically aimed at America or the broader world community.264
Whether or not domestic partners of victims should be included is a
complicated area, which will likely lead to future litigation regardless of
what regulations are put in place, as state views on same-sex marriage con-
tinue to change and cohabitating partners press for more rights. For the time
being, a simple way to address this would be to adopt the approach of the
majority of states, which limits or excludes domestic partners as claim-
ants.265 Moreover, this approach complies with the federal definition of
marriage while the Defense of Marriage Act is still in place.266 Another
complexity in the realm of eligibility is determining which family member
will be the primary claimant in the event there is no surviving spouse. A
simple way to address this would be by comparing various states’ laws and
policies and implementing the most common approach, though more input
from the public should be considered if the public finds this approach
unsatisfactory.
263. See generally Mostaghel, supra note 157, at 104–20 (explaining why a broad definition
of “victim” is beneficial and comports with historical trends).
264. However, to the extent other nations or intergovernmental organizations compensate the
American victims who have suffered due to terrorist attacks abroad, the new permanent fund
should decrease its award to the victims accordingly.
265. See Goldfarb, supra note 51, at 41.
266. The Defense of Marriage Act defines marriage as “a legal union between one man and
one woman.” Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (2006) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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C. Recommendations for Benefits Available to Claimants
Like Israel’s program, all deceased victims should be treated equally,
and death benefits should be standardized based on a government salary.
The appropriate level of government salary should be decided by Congress
through consultation with financial experts and the American public, but a
reasonable starting point of consideration would be the amount awarded to
soldiers killed in duty or in active training for duty. The military award
currently includes a non-taxable $100,000 death gratuity, funeral and burial
expenses up to $8,800, travel expenses for immediate family to attend a
funeral and/or memorial service, a monthly Dependency and Indemnity
Compensation (DIC) based on the number of dependents,267 financial coun-
seling, bereavement counseling, legal assistance, educational benefits, and
access to home loans which may offer better mortgage rates.268
Awards should also be given for treatment and counseling for victims
and surviving families’ psychological harm. When asked about her thoughts
on a permanent fund for victims of terrorism, Dr. Yael Danieli, an expert on
psychological trauma and treatment of victims and survivor populations,
strongly emphasized that such a fund must include provisions for mental
health treatment.269 State crime victim compensation programs and
ITVERP cover mental health treatment to varying extents,270 so the perma-
nent fund should not exclude remedy for this type of harm. Also, the need
for psychological treatment in the context of terrorism is justifiable in light
of terrorists’ goal of inflicting psychological distress on the nation.271 Be-
sides funding treatment, the government should provide funding for special-
ized training of disaster mental health responders272 and the establishment
of targeted support agencies273 to ensure a quality and timely response.
267. For a single surviving spouse, the DIC award is $1,195 per month, adjusted annually for
cost of living. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, A SURVIVOR’S GUIDE TO BENEFITS 14 (Aug. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/Project%20Documents/MilitaryHOME
FRONT/Casualty%20Assistance/Survivors%20Guide.pdf.
268. Id. at 10–18.
269. Conversation with Yael Danieli, Director, Group Project for Holocaust Survivors and
their Children, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 22, 2011). See generally THE TRAUMA OF TERRORISM (Yael
Danieli et al. eds., 2005) (emphasizing the need for provision of psychological treatment for vic-
tims of terrorism and their surviving families); ON THE GROUND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (Yael
Danieli & Robert Dingman eds., 2005) (providing insights gained from mental health responses
following 9/11).
270. Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMP. BDS.,
http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OF-
FICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, What is Covered?, INT’L TERRORISM VICTIM EXPENSE REIMBURSE-
MENT PROGRAM, http://www.ovc.gov/intdir/itverp/expense.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
271. See Brian W. Flynn, Mental Health Response to Terrorism in the United States: An
Adolescent Field in an Adolescent Nation, in THE TRAUMA OF TERRORISM 755, 762 (Yael Danieli
et al. eds., 2005); UNODC, supra note 203, at 94.
272. Lloyd I. Sederer, Challenges of Urban Mental Health Disaster Planning, in THE TRAUMA
OF TERRORISM 695, 703 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 2005).
273. UNODC, supra note 203, at 93–94.
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D. Recommendations for Administration of the Permanent Fund
While Veterans Affairs (VA) has experience with administering the
type of fund most closely associated with this proposed permanent fund for
victims of terrorism, the VA does not seem to be the department best suited
for administering the new fund. The VA’s explicit mission is to serve and
honor America’s veterans;274 victims of terrorist attacks are outside that
scope. While the Department of Homeland Security has experience ad-
ministering benefits and dealing with terrorism, the most fitting body seems
to be the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). The mission fit is strong:
“OVC is committed to enhancing the Nation’s capacity to assist crime vic-
tims and to providing leadership in changing attitudes, policies, and prac-
tices to promote justice and healing for all victims of crime.”275 In addition,
OVC already administers ITVERP and distributes the Crime Victims Fund
to state crime victim compensation programs.276 OVC’s experience inter-
acting with victims and understanding victim needs would also be benefi-
cial to fostering a victim-friendly approach.
In terms of making decisions about awards, OVC should appoint ad-
ministrative law judges or special masters. These decisions should be re-
viewable by a court to avoid problems related to having discretion rest with
a single individual.
E. Non-Monetary Compensation Recommendations
As noted in Part V, Section D, non-monetary compensation is a signif-
icant part of the healing process of the nation, the victims, and their loved
ones in the aftermath of a terrorist act. Creators of a permanent fund should
carefully consider what financial commitment should be made toward this
important aspect of recovery. In particular, policymakers should focus on
public commemoration and preserving the rights of claimants.
1. Commemoration of Victims
While providing a smaller compensation award to each victim would
be a more sound and sustainable policy than awards that reach into the
millions, the new permanent compensation fund should also provide for
commemoration of attacks in forms of memorials, museums, and remem-
brance events. These types of expenses seem particularly well suited to the
role of the federal government, as these forms of commemoration would be
for the public good. They would also be an act of solidarity—the entire
nation standing behind the victims, showing the terrorists that they did not
succeed in their goal of breaking the nation. If the new permanent fund
274. About VA: Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/
about_va/mission.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
275. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 15.
276. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST309.txt unknown Seq: 34 10-MAY-13 14:16
902 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
covered these memorial initiatives fully rather than asking for private dona-
tions, it would free businesses and individuals to give more to charities
which address individual needs.
2. Claimant Participation in the Award Process
Ensuring victim participation in decisions affecting them is another
important form of non-monetary compensation. The Fund gave claimants
the option to have a hearing, which many found to be an important part of
the healing process. The administration of a permanent fund should provide
an opportunity for claimants to be heard, though it need not follow the same
format as the Fund. If the new fund treats claimants more equally, there will
not be the same opportunity or need for individualized hearings. Neverthe-
less, claimants should be given the chance to appeal a decision or seek civil
damages if they so choose.
Surviving victims and family members should also be given a voice in
other decisions that affect them. Carie Lemack’s mother was killed on 9/11
when her plane was involved in the attacks. Shortly thereafter, Lemack co-
founded Families of September 11 to help families. The organization has
also advocated for improvements to aviation safety, an investigation into 9/
11, and a memorial. Lemack told the families, “If we don’t start speaking
out, they’re going to make more decisions affecting us without our say.”277
She advocated for life insurance and pensions to not be deducted from Fund
awards. Along with the Family Steering Committee, Lemack was also in-
strumental in pushing the government to create the 9/11 Commission and
advocating for a later bill to strengthen intelligence-gathering agencies.278
Like Lemack, relatives of victims have a need for clarity, answers, and
accountability. Therefore, the government’s response to terrorism should
involve a forthright investigation, which is then made available to at least
the surviving family members, if not the entire public. The establishment
and work of an investigatory commission for future terrorist attacks should
be funded by the permanent fund in the interest of transparency. Such a
commission could also focus efforts on lessons learned for the prevention
and mitigation of future attacks. The preparation and dissemination of these
reports would be similar to the investigative reports to which surviving de-
pendents of military members killed in duty are entitled.279
Victims should also be given the option of being present in the court-
room when alleged terrorists are put on trial. While the large number of
victims and survivors across the country may make this difficult, accommo-
dations such as closed circuit television should be implemented when nec-
277. Martha T. Moore, Carie Lemack: A Mother Lost, a Cause Found, USA TODAY, Oct. 26,
2001, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-09-02/How-911-changed-us-Per-
son-by-person/50246434/1.
278. Id.
279. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 267, at 12.
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essary. In the 9/11 criminal proceedings against Zacarias Moussaoui, the
Senate passed a bill ordering closed circuit televising of the proceedings to
several “convenient locations” for victims deemed to have a “compelling
interest” in viewing them.280 This accommodation, at minimum, should be
replicated in future large-scale terrorist attacks. For foreign victims and sur-
viving families outside America, efforts should be made to use technology
to allow them to view the proceedings.281
3. Preserving Claimants’ Right to Litigate
Respect for the victims’ and family members’ legal rights should be
another important component of the new permanent fund. When I spoke
with Lemack about how I was writing this Comment recommending a per-
manent fund for victims of terrorism, she said, “Just make sure they don’t
take away our right to sue.”282 She explained that after the trauma of her
mother’s death, she felt disempowered by the ATSSSA’s limits on lawsuits
and her lack of opportunity to seek meaningful justice in that way.
A permanent fund should keep intact claimants’ rights to pursue a liti-
gation option against responsible parties if they choose. The United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recommends that victims should
have “right to bring civil proceedings in order to secure at least symbolic
reparation or to protect their civil rights.”283 Like Israel’s program, the
American program could allow claimants to pursue lawsuits and then
choose between the greater of the awards. Such an option would give
greater incentive to the private sector and the government to take all neces-
sary measures to prevent terrorist attacks, and it would provide victims with
an opportunity to have wrongdoing acknowledged in a meaningful way.
The arguments against a litigation option—potential bankruptcy of
certain industries, astronomical insurance premiums, and the inundation of
court resources—are indeed legitimate, but access to the justice system
should not be abrogated just because these are possible outcomes. If an
industry is going to collapse, the government can still decide to step in to
supplement the industry’s insurance and provide funding to salvage it. In
essence, that is what the Fund did—it just looked different because federal
compensation funds went into the coffers of the Fund instead of directly to
the airline industry.
280. Terrorist Victims’ Courtroom Access Act, S. 1858, 107th Cong. (2002). Zacarias Mous-
saoui was charged with conspiring in the 9/11 attacks, and S. 1858 provided for closed circuit
televising of proceedings so relatives of victims could watch the trial. Bob Port, Senate Bill
Pushes Closed-Circuit Viewing for Victims’ Kin, NY DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 2001, http://www.
nydailynews.com/archives/news/tv-eyed-terror-trial-senate-bill-pushes-closed-circuit-viewing-vic-
tims-kin-article-1.917999.
281. UNODC, supra note 203, at 95.
282. Conversation with Carie Lemack, Co-Founder, Global Survivors Network, N.Y.C., N.Y.
(Nov. 22, 2011).
283. UNODC, supra note 203, at 36.
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F. Engaging Society in a Conversation About the Permanent Fund
A permanent compensation fund should be created after there has been
a deliberate, conversational process with the American public through
events such as town hall meetings, draft policies and opportunities for feed-
back, and the testimony of victims and survivors of prior terrorist attacks.
Congress should incorporate these insights into the legislative process, then
create the new permanent fund and entrust it to an administrative agency.
The administering agency should take the public conversation into earnest
consideration when formulating regulations for administering the fund.
When the regulations are established, the public will have accurate expecta-
tions of who is eligible for compensation, how much modest financial com-
pensation will be available, and what type of non-monetary compensation
will be provided. This will not only help victims know where to turn for
certain forms of help, but it will hopefully spur society to give generously
to supplement the federal response.
The compassion of the American people will rise again if there is an-
other attack, and charities will likely be flooded with donations once again.
These charities, including faith-based organizations, can provide services
and needed funds to victims and their families at the local community level
through offering housing, meals, medical services, counseling, companion-
ship, and more.  This sort of giving and personal responsibility for our fel-
low man should be encouraged by the government because it strengthens
communities, has a deeper interpersonal component than the more distant
federal response, and lifts the burden from the government’s shoulders.
CONCLUSION
The government should not be expected to solve all social ills, but it
should be prepared to address certain national tragedies to provide for its
people and show the world its compassion and resilience.
A permanent compensation fund will never replace legs that will never
again walk or a loved one who will never again come home, but it can
begin to acknowledge the suffering, encourage the broken, and provide
practical help.  If a new terrorist attack strikes America, the public will look
to the support structures it has depended on in the past: family, community,
faith, and government. An approach to a permanent compensation fund for
victims of terrorism should recognize the contribution of each of these
realms and enable each component to do that at which it is best.
If another attack occurs before Congress decides how to resolve com-
pensation of victims, it will once again have to scramble for an ad hoc
solution, and we will have missed an important opportunity to engage soci-
ety in a discussion of values and the role of communities in the healing
process. We have an opportunity to kindle a flame that may be needed to
light the way of tomorrow.  A permanent compensation fund for victims of
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terrorism based on shared risk rationale, social welfare theory, and effi-
ciency, combined with a strengthened role for the community, can be a
spark of hope and healing. A broader definition of eligibility, coverage of
psychological treatment, and provisions for remembrance, participation,
and preserving the right to litigate will result in more meaningful justice for
victims and their families. Putting such a program in place now and estab-
lishing standardized award amounts will prepare America to respond imme-
diately and effectively if terror does strike again.
